South Africa's Political Killings Task Team: A Flawed Shield Against Assassination Politics

 South Africa's Political Killings Task Team: A Flawed Shield Against Assassination Politics

In the shadow of South Africa's vibrant democracy, a sinister phenomenon has taken root: the political assassination. Often linked to intra-party conflicts, tender corruption, and battles for control over municipal resources, these killings have claimed hundreds of lives since the early 2000s, primarily in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and Mpumalanga. In response to this crisis, the South African Police Service (SAPS) established the National Priority Committee on Political Killings, commonly known as the Political Killings Task Team. Its success, however, is a subject of intense debate—a story of hard-won convictions overshadowed by systemic challenges, persistent violence, and a pervasive climate of impunity.

Origins and Mandate: A Response to Crisis

The task team was formally convened in 2018, following a wave of high-profile murders and the recommendations of the Moerane Commission in KZN. This commission of inquiry explicitly investigated the underlying causes of political violence in the province, highlighting the toxic nexus between politics, business, and criminality. The team's mandate was clear but daunting: to proactively investigate, prevent, and prosecute cases of politically motivated murders across the country. It operates as a specialized, multi-disciplinary unit, pulling together detectives from Crime Intelligence, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks), and Forensic Services.

Its creation was a necessary and welcome acknowledgment of a unique form of crime. Unlike random violence, these assassinations are carefully planned, often involving hired hitmen, middlemen, and political or business principals. The motives are seldom ideological but fiercely transactional—eliminating rivals for positions that control municipal budgets, thwarting corruption investigations, or securing lucrative government contracts.

Measurable Successes: Convictions and High-Profile Breakthroughs

Judged purely on its investigative outputs, the task team has achieved notable, hard-fought successes. By its own reports and those of the Ministry of Police, it has secured over 80 convictions since its inception. These are not minor figures. Among its most significant victories are:

1. The Murder of Sindiso Magaqa: The 2023 conviction of former ANC Harry Gwala regional secretary Mluleki Ndobe and others for the 2017 murder of former ANC Youth League secretary-general Sindiso Magaqa was a landmark. It demonstrated the team's ability to pursue cases against politically connected individuals.

2. The "Msunduzi Hitmen" Case: The task team successfully prosecuted a network of hitmen operating in the Pietermaritzburg area, securing multiple life sentences. This disrupted a known assassination-for-hire ring.

3. Consistent Conviction Rate: In numerous other cases, from the killing of Abaqulusi municipality councillor Sibonelo Ntshangase to various assassinations in KZN's volatile northern regions, the team has methodically built cases leading to convictions, often against the actual triggermen and occasionally the intermediaries.

These successes are crucial. They provide a measure of justice for grieving families and send a message that such crimes can be solved. They are the result of dedicated detectives working under extreme pressure and threat.

The Shadow of Challenges: Why Success Feels Incomplete

Despite these convictions, the overall effectiveness of the task team is widely perceived as limited. Its "success" is heavily qualified by several profound and interlinked challenges:

1. The Pace of Justice vs. The Pace of Killing: The investigative process is painstakingly slow, often taking years to secure a single conviction. Meanwhile, new killings continue apace. The task team is perpetually playing catch-up, reacting to a relentless wave of violence rather than decisively stemming it. This creates a public perception of ineffectiveness, as the body count continues to rise.

2. Targeting the "Foot Soldiers," Not the Principals: A persistent criticism is that while hitmen and middlemen are convicted, the political or business principals who allegedly finance and order the hits remain largely untouched. These individuals often wield significant power, influence, and resources, making them difficult to investigate and prosecute. Until the task team can consistently "follow the money and the motive" to the top, it will not dismantle the core architecture of assassination politics.

3. Systemic and Resource Constraints: The team operates within a SAPS facing deep-seated issues: under-resourcing, allegations of corruption within its own ranks, and a lack of adequate witness protection. The latter is particularly critical; witnesses and sometimes even detectives themselves live in fear. The assassination of a key witness in a political murder case is a devastating blow that highlights the extreme danger of this work.

4. The Pervasive Climate of Impunity: The continued frequency of attacks suggests that for many, the risk of being caught and convicted is still outweighed by the perceived rewards of eliminating a rival. This points to a failure of deterrence, which is the ultimate measure of success for any law enforcement initiative.

5. Political Will and Interference: While the national government publicly supports the task team, there are persistent questions about the commitment of local political structures. The Moerane Commission noted that some politicians actively fuel conflict. Suspicions of political interference, or a lack of cooperation from within political parties themselves, can stymie investigations.

Conclusion: A Necessary but Insufficient Bulwark

The Political Killings Task Team is neither a failure nor an unqualified success. It is a necessary but insufficient response to a deeply entrenched societal malady. Its successes in securing convictions are real and commendable, representing pockets of justice in a landscape often defined by lawlessness. It has undoubtedly made it harder for assassins to operate with total impunity.

However, its overall success is severely limited by factors beyond its pure detective work. It is battling a hydra-headed problem where crime is a direct function of political and economic contestation. True success would be measured not by convictions alone, but by a demonstrable and sustained reduction in political assassinations. This has not yet been achieved.

Ultimately, the task team can only be as successful as the ecosystem it operates within allows. Its long-term effectiveness depends on:

· Strengthening witness protection.

· Ensuring absolute independence from political influence.

· Receiving unwavering political and financial support.

· And most importantly, a parallel, robust effort to reform local governance, clean up tender processes, and depoliticize access to state resources.

Until the lucrative incentives for political murder are removed, the task team will remain a critical but overwhelmed fire brigade, putting out individual blazes while the arsonists continue to light new fires. Its work is vital, but South Africa's war on political killings will not be won in the courtroom alone; it must be won in the boardrooms, council chambers, and political conferences where the seeds of these violent conflicts are sown.